BANKRUPTCY-THE
SECTION

70a(5)

INCOME TAX REFUND IS PROPERTY WITHIN

OF THE BANKRUPTCY

ACT; THE WAGE

GAR-

NISHMENT LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

ACT ARE NOT APPLICABLE-Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642

(1974).
Henry A. Kokoszka was temporarily employed in 1971, working the first three months of the year and the last week and a half
of December.' During the interim period Kokoszka received unemployment compensation. 2 For federal income tax purposes he
declared two withholding exemptions, the maximum number of
deductions he was entitled to; 3 and his employer withheld the
proper amount from his wages. 4 For the taxable year 1971
Kokoszka had a gross income of $2,322.005 from which $250.90
was withheld. 6
Kokoszka filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on January
5, 1972. 7 The only asset the trustee in bankruptcy claimed was an
income tax refund check for $250.90 to which Kokoszka was entitled.' The referee in bankruptcy issued an ex parte order ' directing the bankrupt to file his 1971 income tax return l ° and turn over
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 644 (1974).
2 Order on Motion for Rehearing at 1, In re Kokoszka, No. 37,437 (D. Conn., March 24,

1972).
' Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 644 (1974). See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 3402(f)(1)(A), (D).
4 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 644 (1974). The amount to be withheld is
determined under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3402(a), Table l(b). Claiming the maximum
number of exemptions means that the minimum amount of withholding tax will be deducted by the employer.
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 644 (1974).
6 Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 19, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)
(Kokoszka's federal income tax return for taxable year 1971).
' Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 644 (1974). Bankruptcy Act § 18(f), 11 U.S.C.
§ 41(f) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The filing. of a voluntary petition under Chapters 1 to VII of this Act ... shall
operate as an adjudication with the same force and effect as a decree of adjudication.
s Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 644 (1974). The bankrupt also had a 1962
Corvair, which the trustee abandoned to the bankrupt for the sum of $25. Id.
9 The order was issued pursuant to Bankruptcy Act § 2a(15), 11 U.S.C. § Il(a)(15)
(1970).
10 A married couple residing in the same household and filing a joint return need not
file if their gross income for the taxable year is less than $2,800. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6012(a)(l)(A)(ii). But a husband and wife may file a joint return even if one spouse does
not have gross income. Id. § 6013(a). This was Kokoszka's personal situation since his wife
had not been employed. Certificate of Referee on Petition for Review at 2, In re Kokoszka,
No. 37,437 (D. Conn., April 7, 1972).
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to the trustee any tax refund he may receive," and further making
compliance with such order a condition for receiving an entry of
discharge in bankruptcy.' 2 The district court agreed with the referee,' 3 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.'

4

In Kokoszka v. Belford,' 5 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve a conflict among the circuits on two questions: m
16 first,
whether the term "property" as used in section 70a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act' 7 should be construed to include an income tax
refund check, thereby vesting the title to said check in the trustee
in bankruptcy; and second, if such refund is property, whether the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA)' 8 and its limitation on
wage garnishment"' applies to it. A unanimous Court held that the
"' Since Kokoszka had already filed his petition in bankruptcy, the trustee could have
filed the claim for refund himself. See Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 632.
12 Order Re Income Tax Refund and Deferment of Bankrupt's Discharge, In re
Kokoszka, No. 37,437 (D. Conn., Feb. 3, 1972).
13 Memorandum of Decision at 3, In re Kokoszka, No. 37,437 (D. Conn.,July 21, 1972).
'4 In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 998 (2d Cir. 1973).
15 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
I1Id. at 642-43. Compare Gehrig v. Shreves, 491 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1974) (amount due
to minimum withholding is not property; the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) does
not apply to amounts voluntarily withheld over the minimum amount) and In re Cedor, 470
F.2d 996 (9th Cir.), affg 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973)
(excess of minimum withholding is not property; amount due to optional overwithholding is
within the protection of the CCPA) with In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973) (total
amount withheld is property; the CCPA is inapplicable).
17 Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § Il10(a)(5) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
a. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ...

shall . . . be vested by operation

of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is to property which is
held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever located . . . (5)
property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he
could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered ....

The Court's. quotation of section 70a(5) deletes the phrase "except insofar as it is to
property which is held to be exempt." 417 U.S. at 643 n.I.
"8 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). For the purposes of this Note, the pertinent provisions of the CCPA will be Subchapter II-Restrictions on Garnishment, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-77 (1970).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Maximum allowable garnishment.
Except as provided .. . the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings
of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not
exceed
(i) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed
thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage ... at the time the earnings are
payable,
whichever is less.
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refund check is property2 " but that the CCPA does not apply. 2'
Historically, the definition of property which is includable in
the bankrupt's estate and which must be turned over to the trustee
has been comprehensive. As a consequence, virtually all property
which the bankrupt possesses or has an interest in as of the date of
filing his petition in bankruptcy vests in the trustee, with certain
limited exceptions. This was reflected in the earlier national bank22
ruptcy acts.
The Bankruptcy Act of 189823 for the first time made a system
of bankruptcy "a permanent part of our jurisprudence.1 24 That
Act, in contrast to all previous bankruptcy laws, dealt with the
property in the bankrupt's estate by enumerating the types of
property within the estate and not specifying those outside of the
bankrupt's estate.2 5 However, the enumeration of property under
417 U.S. at 648.
Id. at 652.
22 The first national bankruptcy law in the United States was enacted in the year 1800.
Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). This Act applied only to merchants
and provided for a national exemption, namely necessary wearing apparel and bedding. Id.
§§ 1, 5. Except for this specific exemption, the commissioner had authority to take
all the estate, real and personal, of every nature and description to which the said
bankrupt may be entitled, either in law or equity, in any manner whatsoever.
Id. § 5.
The second national bankruptcy act was passed in 1841. Act of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). This Act extended voluntary bankruptcy to "[a]ll persons whatsoever." Id. § 1. The assignee in bankruptcy was vested with the bankrupt's title to "all the
property, and rights of property, of every name and nature, and whether real, personal, or
mixed." Id. § 3. This Act also prescribed a national exemption, which included necessary
household and kitchen furniture, and such other necessaries as the assignee in his discretion
set aside, the value of such items not to exceed $300. Also exempted was "the wearing
apparel of such bankrupt, and that of his wife and children." Id.
The next enactment, Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878), made
bankruptcy available to any person, provided he owed provable debts in excess of $300. Id.
§ 11. Exemptions under this Act were broadened to include necessary household and kitchen
furniture; wearing apparel of the bankrupt, his wife and children; and military uniform,
arms, and equipment for any person who had been in the service of the United States. Id.
§ 14. This Act, for the first time in bankruptcy law, further excepted property which was
exempted from execution by the laws of the state wherein the bankrupt was domiciled or by
the laws of the United States. Property passing to the assignee in bankruptcy was defined as
"all the estate, real and personal." Id. The term "property" under this Act was construed
to
be "broad and comprehensive enough to embrace the whole property of the bankrupt."
Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 540 (1891.).
23 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
24 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
0.01, at 2 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King 1974).
25 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 70a, 30 Stat. 565-66, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1970). In addition to listing particular exemptions, the 1898 Act looked to state law, as did
its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which excepted such property
as is exempted from levy and sale upon execution or other process or order of any
court by. the laws of the State in which the bankrupt has his domicile at the time of
20
21
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section 70a did nothing to undermine the comprehensiveness of
the definition of property, since one purpose of this section of the
1898 Act was "to bring within the control and administration of the
property of the bankrupt and
court absolutely the entire available 26
entitled.1
those
among
it
distribute
While the 1898 Act was amended piecemeal many times 2 7 it
was not until the Bankruptcy Act of 193828 known as the Chandler
Act, that the bankruptcy law of 1898 was comprehensively
amended and supplemented in an attempt to modernize the law of
bankruptcy. 29 The Chandler Act and its amendments 30 effected
many changes31 in section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
however these changes have not restricted the definition of property under section 70a. In fact, the property which must be turned
over to the trustee in bankruptcy has been expanded in many
areas. 2 One could thus contend that bankruptcy laws have historithe commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an amount not exceeding
that allowed by such State exemption laws in force in the year eighteen hundred
and sixty-four ....
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 523. For a discussion of this Act see note 22
supra.
The exemption section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the
petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months or the
greater portion thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548.
The 1867 Act also exempted
such other property as now is, or hereafter shall be, exempted from attachment, or
seizure, or levy on execution by the laws of the United States ....
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 523. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not
contain a comparable provision.
26 H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE ACT
OF CONGRESS OF 1898 AND ITS AMENDMENTS 7 (3d ed. 1922) (emphasis added). See also
Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725, 727 (3d Cir. 1925).
27 See generally I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 0.06, at 12-16 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L.
King 1974). For a list of the amendments see id.at 12 n.6.
28 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970).
21 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 0.01, at 2 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King 1974).
10 The Chandler Act was amended in 1950, 1952, and 1966. See 4A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY

70.03[l], at 31-33 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King 1971).

70.03[l], at 33-34.
"' For a summary of these changes see id.
32 The additions to section 70a include: specifically making the date of filing the
petition in bankruptcy the date of cleavage; vesting the trustee with title to the bankrupt's
property located both within and without the United States; expanding clause 2 to allow the
trustee more time to prosecute an application for a patent, copyright, or trademark; in
clause 3, specifically limiting which powers of the bankrupt would not be turned over to the
trustee; clarifying existing law in clause 5 by including "rights of action" and listing the
rights of action not included within the scope of this term; expanding the rights of action in
clause 6 to include the debtor's right of action to recover usurious interest; enacting clause 7
to include within the bankrupt's estate various contingent and executory interests in real
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Virtually all

the property the bankrupt possesses, has an interest in, or, for
limited types of property, will have an interest in is subject to
distribution to his creditors, except for property specifically exempted by the laws of the state wherein the bankrupt is domiciled
34
or by the laws of the United States.
This emphasis on the rights of creditors is tempered, however,
by the discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Act,3 5 and every
bankruptcy law enacted in the United States has had one.3 ' The
purpose of the discharge is twofold. On the one hand, the possibility of a discharge encourages the debtor to cooperate with the
trustee and the court in the collection and distribution of all the
property which became assignable by the bankrupt within 6 months after the date of filing;
codification of existing law in clause 8 to include bequests, devises, or inheritances which vest
in the bankrupt within 6 months after filing the petition in bankruptcy. Id. 70.03[2], at
35-37.
As regards section 70a(5), Collier states that "[i]t is probably sufficiently broad to
include all, or nearly all, the classes of property enumerated in the other clauses of the
subdivision." Id. 70.15[1], at 136. By definition, section 70a(5) includes property which is
transferable or leviable on the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy. However, this section
may in fact be broad enough to include: property that is fraudulently transferred; rights of
action belonging to the debtor; certain rights of action belonging to a creditor; real property
interests such as a life estate, and equity of redemption, a lease, a contract for the sale of
land, rights as lienor, rents on mortgaged property, public land rights, contingent interests,
dower and curtesy, and joint estates in real property; interests in personal property and its
proceeds; fixtures; pledged property; pensions; personal contracts; franchises and licenses;
stock exchange seats; good will; insurance policies; property held by or for the bankrupt in
trust; bequests, devises, or inheritances; certain rights of action such as for personal injury,
damage to property, loss-carryback refunds; certain rights of action of a corporate bankrupt; bank deposits; wages, fees, or commissions; and certain rights in partnership property.
See generally id.
70.15-35, at 135-453.
" See IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
14.01[6], at 1260.2 (14th rev. ed. J. MOORE & L.
King 1974); id.
14.02[1], at 1261.
Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). That section provides:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which
are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the
time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile
for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer
portion of such six months than in any other State ....
Id.
The Chandler Act reintroduced the allowance of exemptions provided by the laws of
the United States. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847. This allowance had been
included in the 1867 Act; however, it was deleted from the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See
note 25 supra.
11 See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 14-17, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32-35 (1970). A "discharge" is
defined as "the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy,
except such as are excepted by this Act." Id. § 1(15), 11 U.S.C. § 1(15). Debts which may be
proved are found in id. § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103.
36 IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
14.01[1], at 1246.1 (14th rev. ed.J. Moore & L. King
1974). For a thorough discussion of the various discharge provisions throughout the American history of bankruptcy legislation see id.
14.01, at 1246.1-1260.3.
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assets of his estate. On the other hand, it gives the honest debtor an
incentive to accumulate new assets in the future.3 7 This rehabilitative aspect of the discharge has come to be conceptualized as the
3
"fresh start" doctrine.

8

Wetmore v. Markoe39 represents the Supreme Court's first
acknowledgment of the fresh start doctrine. While expressly recognizing the existence of that doctrine, the Court held that arrears
in alimony under a final decree of absolute divorce were not a
provable debt barred by a discharge in bankruptcy." The Court
stipulated that the debt in question should not be discharged "[u]nless positively required by direct enactment."'4 I This result was

reinforced in Burlingham v. Crouse,4 2 in which the Court construed
a proviso of section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 regarding
life insurance. The Court considered the fresh start of the bankrupt to leave him with only "such exemptions and rights as the
statute left untouched.

'4 3

And in a companion case 44 dealing with

the same life insurance proviso, the Court developed the "line of
cleavage" concept, wherein the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy is taken as the cutoff date for the bankrupt's financial
affairs.4 5 Prior property vests in the trustee unless expressly
exempted, and prior debts may be discharged if provable. But
after-acquired property and after-acquired debts still remain with
the bankrupt. 46 This line of cleavage interpretation of the fresh
3 Id.

14.01[6], at 1260.2.

31 Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904), was the first Supreme Court case to give

expression to the fresh start doctrine:
Systems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
indebtedness which has become oppressive and to permit him to have a fresh start
in business or commercial life, freed from the obligation and responsibilities which
may have resulted from business misfortunes.
Id. at 77.
3- 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
40 Id. at 76.
41 Id. at 77.
42

228 U.S. 459 (1913).

41 Id. at 473.

44 Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913).
IId. at 479. The Court stated:
We think that the purpose of the law was to fix the line of cleavage with
reference to the condition of the bankrupt estate as of the time at which the petition
was filed and that the property which vests in the trustee at the time of adjudication
is that which the bankrupt owned at the time of the filing of the petition.
Id. This rationale was incorporated in the Chandler Act, wherein the trustee is "vested by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy." Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70a, 52 Stat. 879.
46 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
70.09, at 103, 105 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King
1971). This conceptualization of the date of cleavage doctrine is the general rule. Of course
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start doctrine was reapplied just two years later in a case involving
a contract to indemnify a surety. 47 There the Court reaffirmed the
fact that while a creditor has the opportunity to share in a distribution of the bankrupt's assets, the discharge of a debt terminates the
debtor-creditor relationship. 48 Similarly, in Stellwagen v. Clum, 49 upholding an Ohio fraudulent conveyance statute, the Court interpreted the bankrupt's fresh start to mean "free from debts, except
of a certain character, after the property ... owned at the time of
bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of creditors. 5 ,

The idea of giving the debtor a fresh start at the date of filing
the petition in bankruptcy is further supported by Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt.5 There the Court considered the validity of a state rule that
recognized as a non-dischargeable debt the assignment of future
wages made prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy.5 2 A unanimous
Court held the assignment invalid, reasoning that under the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, the discharge and release from debt
could not logically be supposed to create
an enforceable lien upon a subject not existent when the bankruptcy became effective or even arising from, or connected with,
preexisting property, but brought into being
solely as the fruit
53
of the subsequent labor of the bankrupt.
As the respondent in Kokoszka aptly pointed out, the Court has
treated the fresh start doctrine as
simply a characterization of the benefits flowing to the debtor
after bankruptcy-relief from the obligation of pre-bankruptcy
there are exceptions. These exceptions-that is, assets also held to be property within the
bankrupt's estate as of the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy-include proceeds of
property which was in the bankrupt's estate as of the date of filing, and interests which vest
in the bankrupt or become assignable by him within 6 months after he files his petition, such
as "future interests in realty, property passing by bequest, devise, or inheritance, and
property held by the entirety at bankruptcy." Id. 70.07[1], at 90 (footnotes omitted).
Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
IId. at 556-57.
4- 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
so Id. at 617.
51 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
52 Id. at 242.
11 Id. at 243.
In Legg v. St. John, 296 U.S. 489 (1936), the Court was faced with the difficult task of
deciding that disability payments to a totally and permanently disabled person, payable
under a matured supplementary contract to a life insurance policy, were property which had
to be turned over to the trustee. Id. at 491-92. This asset was distinguished from that in
Local Loan on the grounds that the disability benefits were not after-acquired property, not
"in any sense future earnings," and "not the fruit of anything to be done by [the bankrupt]
after the adjudication." Id. at 495-96. Since not exempt under state law, the disability
payments passed to the trustee. Id. at 496.
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debts, retention of exempt property provided in 5 Section
6 of the
4
Act, and freedom to accumulate future wealth.

This balancing of the creditor-oriented purpose of the Bankruptcy Act against its debtor-oriented purpose has recently come
into focus. While it was once considered firmly established that the
bankrupt must turn over to the trustee any claim or right of action

he may have against the Government for a refund of taxes paid 5 5
some recent cases have called into question whether this same
principle should apply to an excess of tax withheld by the employer
from the wage earner's pay. In Segal v. Rochelle,5 6 the Court, resolving a conflict among the circuits, 7 held that a business-generated
11 Brief for Belford as Amicus Curiae in Support of the judgment Below at 23,
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). The trustee in bankruptcy waived briefing the
case and oral argument before the Court. This amicus brief was submitted pursuant to the
Court's invitation to brief and argue the case in support of the judgment below. 415 U.S.
956 (1974).
.55 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY
70.28[4], at 393 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King
1971). See Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1964), wherein the court cites this
section of Collier and In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962), discussed below.
In Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925), after noting the expansive nature of
section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the court held that an income tax refund check
was properly includable as property within the bankrupt's estate based upon the broadness
of the phrase " 'rights of action arising ... from the unlawful taking or detention of ... his
property.' "Id. at 727-28 (quoting from Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 70a(6), 30 Stat. 566, as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(6) (1970)). In Snyder v. Routzahn, 55 F.2d 396 (N.D. Ohio
1931), the court considered a compromise of taxes by a bankrupt corporation and found the
income tax refund to be a "chose in action with a specific character" to be listed on the asset
schedule under "'unliquidated claims of every nature with their estimated value.' " Id. at 396.
In In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962), the court held that the trustee was
entitled to the income tax refund due from wages withheld prior to the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, while the wage earner would be entitled to the refund due to postbankruptcy withholdings. Id. at 847. The court rejected the section 70a(6) argument that the
property was unlawfully taken or detained. Instead, it applied section 70a(5), reasoning that
the income tax refund could be assigned or transferred under federal and state law. Id.
In In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972), the court
held the income tax refund from a joint return to be part of the bankrupt's property. 453
F.2d at 547-48. Under Missouri law, property held by the entirety is not includable in the
bankrupt's estate unless both husband and wife are petitioning the bankruptcy court and the
proceedings are consolidated. Id. at 546. Filing a joint tax return does not automatically
create an estate by the entirety. Therefore, where there are no proper words of conveyance
adequate to show the grantor's intent, the referee can require that a non-bankrupt wife who
did not have gross income for that year endorse the refund check which was made payable
to both the husband and wife to enable the proceeds to be administered as an asset of the
bankrupt husband's estate. Id. at 547.
See also Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 632, wherein the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue took the position that the overpayment of income taxes by an individual
taxpayer is an asset of the bankrupt's estate even though it is not yet reduced to possession,
and further, that the trustee in bankruptcy himself is permitted to file the claim for refund.
56 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
5' In Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1964), the court held the loss-
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loss-carryback tax refund,5 based on pre-bankruptcy losses but
received after bankruptcy, passes to the trustee under section
70a(5).5 : The Court reasoned that "property" is defined in various
ways in different legal contexts; therefore, in attempting to define
property, the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act itself must control:
The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable
form when he files his petition. To this end the term "property"
has been construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.6
This "main thrust" behind the definition of property is limited,
however, by another "highly prominent" purpose of the Act-the
fresh start, which allows the bankrupt to accumulate new wealth
after the date of filing his petition in bankruptcy. 6' But the losscarryback refund does not affect the bankrupt's ability to make a
fresh start. That claim arises from taxes paid on net income within
the past three years and a net operating loss in the year of bankcarryback tax refund to be property. The First and Third Circuits had held otherwise. In In
re Sussman, 289 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1961), while recognizing that "accrued and immediately
determinable and enforceable claims" for refunds undisputably passed to the trustee, the
court reasoned that the loss-carryback refund could not pass to the trustee, since on the date
Sussman filed his petition in bankruptcy there was no "right of action" in existence and such
right would not arise until the end of the taxable year. Id. at 77-78. The court further noted
that "this concept of 'title' to 'property' connotes an ownership interest in some res, whether
that res shall be corporeal property or a chose in action." Id. at 78. At the time of filing his
petition, Sussman had no legal or equitable interest in any existing cause of action within the
meaning of section 70a(5). Further, the court reasoned that under the provisions of federal
law, such a contingent claim could not be assigned or attached. Therefore, the claim was not
transferable within the meaning of section 70a(5). Id. This "unfortunate" result was deemed
" 'a windfall to the bankrupt at the expense of the creditors.'" Id. (quoting from the unreported opinion of the referee).
Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963), was a case "on all fours" with
Sussman, the only difference being that Fournier filed his petition in bankruptcy closer to the
end of the taxable year, thereby making the difference "merely one of degree." Id. at 526.
The court in Fournier agreed with the reasoning of Sussman, declaring that since the net
loss-carryback did not arise until the end of the taxable year, such a contingent claim could
not come within section 70a(5) inasmuch as "the prospect, hope or expectation of a claim is
not a right of action." Id. at 527. Similarly, the mere possibility of such a claim arising is not
"property," since there is "no res or chose in action in existence on the date of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy." Id. Fournier, however, did not address the issue of transferability
as did Sussman, since the court felt that holding the contingent claim not to be property was
dispositive of the case. Id.
-" The loss-carryback refund arises under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
-9 382 U.S. at 378-79.
60 Id. at 379.
61 Id.
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ruptcy. 62 Though the calculation of such amount at the end of the
taxable year makes the claim contingent, 63 the refund claim

is sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little
entangled .with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered
fresh start that it should be regarded as "property" under
§ 70a(5).6 4
Once it has been determined that the loss-carryback is property at
the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy, it still remains to be
considered whether such property is transferable.6 5 Since the
Court found transferability proper under the applicable state law,
section 70a(5) was operative inasmuch as the loss-carryback refund
was an existent asset at the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy
and was transferable.

6

Four years later the Court had occasion to consider the
applicability of section 70a(5) to a different type of asset. In Lines v.
Frederick,6 7 the Court held that vacation pay, accrued prior to the
date of filing the petition in bankruptcy, but not collectible until
either the plant's annual shutdown for vacation, or under a conventional voluntary vacation plan, or upon final termination of
employment, does not pass to the trustee as section 70a(5) property.6 8 The Court in Lines applied basically the same considerations
to vacation pay as it had in Segal to the loss-carryback refund,
noting the impossibility of defining property without looking to the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, the "main thrust" of the Act62 Id. at

380.

6" See note 57 supra. The claim is contingent unless the petition in bankruptcy is filed

after the end of the taxable year, in which case it would be a determinable amount.
11 382 U.S. at 380. The Court looked to the fact that
any administrative inconvenience to the bankrupt will not be prolonged ... and the
bankrupt without a refund claim to preserve has more reason to earn income
rather than less.
Id. (citation omitted).
65 Id. at 381. What constitutes a "transfer" is a federal question; however, the transferability of a certain res is usually determined by state law, unless a federal statute is controlling.
Id. n.6. See also 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
70.15[2], at 144-47 & nn.22, 25 (14th rev. ed.
J. Moore & L. King 1971).
66 382 U.S. at 385. Although a federal assignment statute was involved, the Court
reasoned that while the bankrupt's assignment would not be enforceable against the Government, a Texas court of equity would enforce such an assignment by the bankrupt to
another individual. Id. at 384-85.
67 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam).
68 Id. at 18, 20. Upon a petition for certiorari, the Court rendered a per curiam opinion
granting certiorari .and at the same time affirming the court below. Chief Justice Burger
would have denied certiorari, and Justice Harlan dissented. Id. at 2 1. Justice Harlan's dissent
argued that due to the close question and the split of opinion in the courts of appeals, the
Court should have allowed oral argument on the issue. Id. at 22.
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"'to secure for creditors everything of value' " in the bankrupt's
6n
estate-and the generous recognition of contingent interests. 1
However, here Lines and Segal parted ways, the Lines Court further
reasoning that the most important limitation in defining section
70a(5) property was the "basic purpose" of the Act-to give the
bankrupt a fresh start after the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy.7 ' The Court felt that applying these considerations to vacation pay would "compel a decision for the bankrupt."'" Important
to the Court's decision was the fact that the bankrupt was a wage
earner whose vacation pay represented
"a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in
our economic system." . .. Where the minimal requirements for

the economic survival of the debtor are at stake, legislatures have
recognized that protection that might be unnecessary or unwise
for other kinds of property may be required.72
It should be noted that the Court was not unanimous in this
decision. Dissenting, Justice Harlan objected that the order
exempting vacation pay afforded the bankrupt something more
73
than the required fresh start-it amounted to a "head start.
Not until after the Lines decision, with its emphasis on the
importance of wages to the fresh start of the debtor, did the
question of an income tax refund check based on the overwithholding of tax from an employee's wages become a viable issue. 74 In In
Id. at 19 (quoting from Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966)).
10 400 U.S. at 19.
69

71 Id. at 20.
72 Id. (quoting from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969))
(citation omitted).
While the Court here noted that legislatures will often give special protection to wages,
it should be pointed out that the California state legislature had provided some protection
for vacation pay. The Court acknowledged this, stating that one-half of the vacation pay
accrued during the 30 days prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy was exempted by
the referee pursuant to California law. 400 U.S. at 18.
73 400 U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Under California law,
the bankrupt did receive a certain amount of his accrued vacation pay. See note 72 supra.
The crux of Justice Harlan's dissent was that if a person started work on the date the debtor
filed his petition in bankruptcy, which Justice Harlan termed "the paradigm of 'an unencumbered fresh start,' " that person would not have any vacation pay. 400 U.S. at 21. A
debtor with accrued vacation pay who declared bankruptcy would still be entitled under
California law to half a day's pay. The bankrupt therefore is getting something more than a
fresh start. Id. at 21-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the Court in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
14 The Lines Court's emphasis on the importance of wages raised questions about other
wage-related assets accruing to the bankrupt. See, e.g., In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972), holding that the non-exempt portion of a
bankrupt's wages, accrued but unpaid as of the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy,
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re Cedor,7 5 the district court held that to the extent "the tax refund
to a bankrupt is attributable to an excess of the minimum amount"
withheld from wages, the refund is not property within section
70a(5) and therefore need not be turned over to the trustee.7 6 The
Cedor court noted that in considering the income tax refund check
it was "confronted with elements of both Segal and Lines," but in
light of the reasoning of Lines, concluded that "the balance on this
77
question tips in favor of the bankrupt.
Recognizing that the decision in Lines was grounded on the
character of the asset which the trustee claimed, the court asserted
that "[i]f Lines stands for anything, it is that the practical realities
are controlling in this determination. '78 Viewing the practicalities,
the Cedor court reasoned that the refund was not related to any
losses which had precipitated the bankruptcy as did the losscarryback refund in Segal, but rather that the income tax refund
resulted from "a forced overpayment of tax on wages."' 7' Further,
although the amount of the refund was not as easy to calculate as
vacation pay, the income tax refund is a "planned-on annually
recurring payment," equally as important as two weeks paid vacation.8 0 The refund from minimum withholding is not property
because of these realities; however, any amount which is the result
of voluntary overwithholding does pass to the trustee since such
amount is not a forced payment. Instead, it may be the result of a
conscious choice by "an astute candidate for bankruptcy" who
knew that the income tax refund would not be turned over to the
trustee.8 1 The amount withheld over the minimum, therefore, is
8 2
property. Since it is transferable, it passes to the trustee.
As a result of the conflict among the circuits on the applicability of section 70a(5) to the income tax refund, and possibly due to a
fear that the Lines rationale would be extended to many other
assets related to wages, the Supreme Court reached the issue in
passes to the trustee and does not interfere with the bankrupt's ability to make a fresh start.
Under Ohio law the non-exempt portion of wages was $71.50 out of $925.90 unpaid wages.
458 F.2d at 973.
'- 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 973 (1973). For other circuit cases dealing with the income tax refund check and the
Wage Garnishment Act see note 16 supra.
11 337 F. Supp. at 1105 (emphasis by court).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. (emphasis by court).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1106.
82

Id.
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Kokoszka v. Belford.8 3 The Court in Kokoszka, like its predecessors in
Segal and Lines, approached section 70a(5) by noting the impossibility of defining property categorically, so that its meaning must be
determined by reference to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Court further recognized that "Segal and Lines, while construing § 70a(5) in almost identical language, reached contrary results."8 4 Rather than resolving this inconsistency, the Court implied
that the inconsistency was the result of the test applied to section
70a(5) property:
[T]he crucial analytical key [is] not in an abstract articulation of
the statute's purpose but in an analysis85 of the nature of the asset
involved in light of those principles.
The Court then applied this "nature of the asset" test to distinguish
the vacation pay in Lines from the income tax refund, stating that
the income tax refund "does not relate conceptually to future
wages and it is not the equivalent of future wages for the
purpose of giving the bankrupt a 'fresh start.' "86 The crucial
distinction is that the vacation pay
was designed to function as a wage substitute at some future
period and, during that future period, to "support the basic
requirements of life for [the debtors] and their families .... "87
The Court therefore included the income tax refund as property
within section 70a(5), reasoning that it is not " 'weekly or other
periodic income' " necessary for the wage earner's basic support,
and that merely having a "'source in wages'" does not give a
property interest any special protection since many assets of the
bankrupt's estate have their " 'origin in wages.'-s8
The Court in Kokoszka purported to employ what may be
termed a "functional approach." A court utilizing such an approach examines the nature of the asset in terms of its operation or
function within the structure of the Act. This functional approach
to property is a fairly recent conceptualization of the definition of
property under section 70a(5). That section is "the most com83 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
For another discussion of the judicial treatment afforded
income tax returns under the Bankruptcy Act as well as the Second Circuit's decision in
Kokoszka see Note, Treatment of Income Tax Refunds in Bankruptcy After Lines v. Frederick, 72
MICH. L. REv. 331 (1973).
11 417 U.S. at 646.

85 Id.

Id. at 647.
" Id. at 648 (quoting from Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970)) (emphasis by
Court) (brackets added by the Kokoszka Court).
88 417 U.S. at 648 (quoting from In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973)).
86
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prehensive of all the clauses" of section 70a, and it would appear to
be comprehensive enough to include all the other types of property under section 70a.1"' Under the present section 70a, the trustee
is vested with the title to all the bankrupt's property except insofar
as such property is exempted under section 6,o with certain limited exceptions." '
The traditional test applied to property to determine whether
it would come within section 70a(5) is whether, at the date of
filing the petition in bankruptcy, the property could have been
either "transferred by the bankrupt, or . . . levied upon and sold

under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered."9 2 The functional test represents a de-

parture from this traditional test. Whereas the Court formerly
looked at whether the asset was transferable or leviable as of the
date of filing, it did not concern itself with how the asset operated,
that is, what possible value the asset might have to the debtor's
estate. This is not to say that the traditional test for defining section
70a(5) property ignores the fresh start of the bankrupt. Rather, it
applies the fresh start doctrine in an objective manner, by insuring
that the bankrupt's future opportunities, or post-filing opportunities, are not invaded, instead of weighing the amount of benefit
a particular asset might have for the bankrupt.
While the Court in Kokoszka seems to indicate that both Segal
and Lines applied the same functional test to section 70a(5) property,9 3 it can be argued that Segal in fact applied the traditional test
to the loss-carryback refund. Segal applied a two-part test to the
asset, considering first whether it was property, then whether it was
transferable. 94 At first glance it would appear that when the Court
s9 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

70.15[1], at 136 (14th rev. ed.

J.

Moore & L. King

1971).

90 Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) provides:

This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which
are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the
time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile
for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer
portion of such six months than in any other State: Provided, however, That no such
allowance shall be made out of the property which a bankrupt transferred or
concealed and which is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Act
for the benefit of the estate, except that, where the voided transfer was made by
way of security only and the property recovered is in excess of the amount secured
thereby, such allowance may be made out of such excess.
91 See note 46 supra.
70.15[2], at 137 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King
92 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1971) (footnote omitted). Note that the transferability of the income tax refund was not in
dispute in this case. 417 U.S. at 643 n.1.
93 417 U.S. at 646.
91 382 U.S. at 381.
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considered whether the loss-carryback refund was property, it
applied the functional test to the asset. However, Segal did not
consider how the asset operated within the debtor's estate, but
rather addressed the question of whether the loss-carryback was
even an existent asset on the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy, or whether such an asset did not come into existence until
the end of the taxable year. Segal's main emphasis was on deciding
whether a refund of such a contingent nature was an asset of the
bankrupt's estate on the date of filing. Once it had held that such
was the case, the Court then applied the traditional test of transferability.
It appears, then, that Lines was actually the first case to apply
the functional test to property under section 70a(5). This was the
result of a subtle change in emphasis on the dual purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act. Segal stated that the "main thrust" of bankruptcy
was to accumulate the debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors,
limited by the "highly prominent" purpose of providing the debtor
with a fresh start. 95 Lines, however, elevated the debtor's fresh start
to a "basic purpose" of bankruptcy, supporting this result by citing
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.96 But Local Loan was concerned with
whether a debtor's unaccrued but future assets could be applied to
debts supposedly discharged in bankruptcy and thus did not represent the same factual situation as in Lines. Where Lines was concerned with an amount already accrued to the bankrupt, Local Loan
dealt with assets to be obtained by the debtor after his discharge.
While the subtle change in the Court's attitude toward the debtor's
fresh start may appear to be unworthy of note, it gave the Court
the springboard it needed to deal with the functions of the already
accrued vacation pay as it related to the post-filing financial situation of the bankrupt. Relying on the importance conferred upon
wages in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 9 7 the Lines Court
reasoned that vacation pay was just as important to the bankrupt as
other types of wages in that vacation pay could support the basic
requirements of life for the wage earner and his family as did
other wages. Therefore, the bankrupt needed his vacation pay to
achieve a " 'new opportunity in life.' '98,
While there can be no doubt about the importance of wages to
95 Id. at 379.
.6 292 U.S. 234 (1934). See 400 U.S. at 19. For a discussion of Local Loan see notes 51-53
supra and accompanying text.
97 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
98 400 U.S. at 20 (quoting from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
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the wage earner, whether bankrupt or not, it seems anomalous to
apply the reasoning of Sniadach to the bankruptcy situation in
Lines. The significance of Sniadach is that some forms of property,
there the use of wages, 9 9 could not be taken from a person without
such prior notice and hearing as would satisfy the requirements of
procedural due process of law."' 0 Bankruptcy, however, is a total
legal process in itself. Thus, it is questionable whether these same
considerations should be applied to a wage-based asset earned or
accrued prior to the filing of the petition as the Court in Lines did.
This was the import of Justice Harlan's dissent in Lines.' 0 ' So while
the holding of Lines may be emotionally satisfying to people other
than creditors, it appears that the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act
were slightly contorted in reaching this result.
While it is arguable that the functional approach to property
was applied in Lines but not in Segal, a question arises as to whether
that test was in fact applied in Kokoszka, as the Court felt it was.
One way of determining this is to compare the functions of vacation pay with the functions of the income tax refund check to
ascertain whether there is enough of a functional difference between the two assets to justify their different treatment by the
Court. 0 2 Both the income tax refund and the vacation pay are
related to the wage earner's employment, and both assets have
their source in wages.'
Both amounts of money were accrued but
unpaid at the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy.10 4 Finally,
both sums are unreachable until a specified date.'
""While the maj~ority opinion spoke of property in general terms, Justice Harlan
specified that what the petitioner was actually being deprived of was "the use of the
garnished portion of her wages during the interim period between the garnishment and the
culmination of the main suit." 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
100395 U.S. at 342.
101400 U.S. at 21-22. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
102 The petitioner argued that there was no difference and therefore the income tax
refund should be treated as the Lines Court treated vacation pay. Brief for Petitioner at
9-11, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
It is interesting to note that the commission report on proposed changes in the bankruptcy laws affords the income tax refund and accrued vacation pay the exact same treatment. Both are included within cash, securities, and receivables which would be exempt up
to an aggregate amount of not more than $500. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, 93d
Cong., IstSess., pt. II, § 4-503(c)(3), at 125 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWs]. See note 122 infra.
103 Compare 417 U.S. at 648 with 400 U.S. at 20.
104 Kokoszka filed his petition in bankruptcy on January 5, 1972. In mid-February, he
filed his income tax return for the taxable year 1971 and did not receive the refund check
until several weeks later. 417 U.S. at 644. See also 400 U.S. at 18.
1"5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3402(a) requires the employer to withhold certain
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The Kokoszka Court reasoned that the crucial distinction between the two assets was that the vacation pay was periodic and
functioned as a wage-substitute for a future period. During such
future period, the vacation pay would provide the wage earner and
his family with " 'the basic requirements of life.' "106 This distinction pales, however, when one considers that the income tax refund check is also received at a future time, 1 7 that its receipt may
be an anticipated event, and that due to the financial state of affairs
of a bankrupt, this refund may in fact be used to support the basic
requirements of life for the wage earner and his family.10 8 Further,
the Court's analogizing the income tax refund to a savings account
or an investment in an automobile, which may also have their
'source in wages,' "109 loses much of its force when one considers
that the minimum amount of withholding is involuntary, whereas
maintaining a savings account or investing in an automobile are
voluntary choices. Also, both the income tax refund and the vacation pay would aid the debtor in reestablishing a positive financial
position.'l" And 'significantly, if either asset were taken from the
bankrupt, it would provide little financial benefit to any of his
creditors.'

i1

Since the functions of the two assets are so closely related and
the value of each asset to the debtor is basically the same, it appears
that the Kokoszka Court did not in fact apply a functional definition
amounts from wages. See also 400 U.S. at 18. The wage earner could not reach the vacation
pay until the plant was closed for vacation, until he was laid off, or, in the case of respondent
Harris, until he voluntarily chose to take his vacation. Id.

"' 417 U.S. at 648 (quoting from Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. at 20 (1970)).
107

See note 104 supra.

108 See Note, The Income Tax Refund as a Possible Asset of a Wage Earner's Bankruptcy Estate,

87 HARV. L. REV. 395, 405 (1973). Kokoszka could have used the income tax refund to help

pay for a hernia operation, dental work, and eyeglasses. Order on Motion for Rehearing at
2, In re Kokoszka, No. 37,437 (D. Conn., March 24, 1972).
109 417 U.S. at 648 (quoting from In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973)).

110 The income tax refund due Kokoszka was $250.90. 417 U.S. at 644. However, the
vacation pay due to the bankrupts in Lines amounted to $137.28 and $144.14. 400 U.S. at
18. While the amount due Kokoszka was not payable as weekly compensation, it is contended that the income tax refund is just as important to the bankrupt. See note 108 supra.

'"I One study found that administrative expenses consume 41% of the assets in personal bankruptcy cases. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPrCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM

91 (1971) [hereinafter cited as STANLEY & GIRTH]. Based upon this fact, the amount of
money available to Kokoszka's creditors would be $148.03, or 59% of the refund check.
Kokoszka had $6,105.22 in unsecured debts. Brief for Belford as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Judgment Below at 37, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). Thus, the creditors

would only be getting a return from his estate of $0.024 on the dollar.
While the amount of return per dollar varies among the different classes of creditors,
the average return to creditors of all classes would be no more than $0.55 cents on the
dollar. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra at 22 (based on 1964 statistics).
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to determine whether an asset was section 70a(5) property.
Kokoszka then might well be interpreted as a signal to bankrupts
that the functional approach to property will no longer be applied
and the Court will no longer define property by looking at how
beneficial the asset would be to the bankrupt, but instead will look
to whether the asset in fact exists at the date of filing the petition in
bankruptcy, and if it does, whether such asset may be transferred
or levied upon. Such an attitude conforms to the traditional definition of property within the Bankruptcy Act, and it would seem to
provide a more stable position for even unsecured creditors, since
Lines has been interpreted as "a very narrow exception to the
general proposition that everything of value passes to the trustee." 1 12
Once the Court had decided that the income tax refund check
was an asset of the bankrupt's estate to be considered section 70a(5)
property, it had little difficulty in disposing of the issue of whether
the refund came within the protection of the CCPA which exempts
75 percent of an individual's disposable earnings from garnishment.' 13 The Court held the CCPA inapplicable by employing the
same reasoning used in distinguishing the income tax refund check
from vacation pay-namely, that the CCPA protections do not
apply to an asset which does not represent "periodic payments of
compensation needed to support the wage earner and his family
' 4
on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis." "
Since the CCPA protects the individual's disposable earnings," '15 the Court looked to the legislative history of the CCPA to
determine what purpose the legislature had in mind when it
enacted the CCPA, and what Congress sought to include within the
In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 994 (2d Cir. 1973). In its discussion of the CCPA, the
Supreme Court emphasized the traditional interpretation of the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act, that is, "to assemble, once a bankruptcy petition is filed, all of the debtor's assets for the
benefit of his creditors." 417 U.S. at 650.
112

l1a See note 19 supra.

417 U.S. at 651.
See note 19 supra. 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (1970) provides:
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal
services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any
individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts
required by law to be withheld,
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable procedure through
which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of
any debt.
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definition of the term "disposable earnings." 1 6 Congress recognized that in recent years it has been noted that there is a high
correlation between the harshness of a state's garnishment laws and
17
the number of consumers declaring bankruptcy in that state.'
Consequently, the purposes of subchapter II of the CCPA were to
reduce the overextension of credit to the debtor, preserve the
debtor's employment, and allow the wage earner enough money to
support himself and his family, thereby protecting many consumer
debtors from "'plunging into bankruptcy,' " while at the same time
permitting a limited amount of the debtor's earnings to be used to
pay off his debts.' 1 8 As the Court noted, "Congress' concern was
not the administration of a bankrupt's estate but the prevention of
bankruptcy in the first place."' 1" Congress sought to protect the
amount of wages over which the debtor gained personal control on
a regular basis. Thus, the debtor could use his wages to gradually
pay off his debts in an orderly fashion without being deprived of
his necessary support, but "if, despite [the CCPA's] protection,
bankruptcy did occur, the debtor's protection
and remedy re' 120
mained under the Bankruptcy Act."

Kokoszka v. Belford, then, is undoubtedly a landmark in bankruptcy law. Its importance extends beyond the dual-holding of the
case itself, and it is significant for its reflection of the Court's
attitude toward what will be considered property within section 70a
as well as its attitude toward the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
itself.
Kokoszka, while reiterating the functional or nature of the asset
test, considered an asset virtually indistinguishable from the vacation pay in Lines and held it to be section 70a(5) property. Since the
vacation pay is functionally so similar to the income tax refund, it
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Court has sounded the
death knell for the short-lived functional approach to property. It
appears that the Court in Kokoszka is returning not only to the
traditional view of the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act-"to assemble, once a bankruptcy petition is filed, all of the debtor's assets for
417 U.S. at 650-51.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 21 (1967). See also STANLEY & GIRTH,
supra note 113, at 30-3 1; Brunn, Wage Garnishmentin California:A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1236 (1965); Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy, 35 REF. J. 37,
38 (1961). The Bankruptcy Commission also took cognizance of this fact. REPORT OF THE
'COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 102, pt. I, at 49-50.
'18 417 U.S. at 651 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1967)).
'19 417 U.S. at 650 (emphasis by Court).
120 Id. at 651.
116
"7
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the benefit of his creditors" 21-but also to the traditional test of
section 70a(5) property-if the asset is in existence on the date of
filing the petition in bankruptcy, whether that asset is transferable
or leviable.1 22 Kokoszka, then, stands for the premise that Lines
and its reasoning is limited to "a very narrow exception to the
general proposition that everything of value passes to the trustee."1 23 With this reaffirmation that the Bankruptcy Act exists for
the benefit of creditors, the Court is indicating that it will no longer
be swayed by what are in effect policy arguments that favor the
exclusion of various assets. Therefore, the holding of Kokoszka can
serve to better "secure" unsecured creditors.
Ronald L. Bennardo
12I
122

Id. at 650.
4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

70.15[2], at 137 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore & L. King

1971).
The Court perhaps wanted to keep clear of possible conflicts with Congress over the
interpretation of the definition of property due to the fact that recent Congresses have been
concerned with the possibility of reorganizing the bankruptcy laws. For while the term
"property" is subject to judicial construction, there is no doubt that the primary responsibility for the definition of property is on the legislature. A commission study published in 1973
suggested a comprehensive scheme of reform. See REPORT OF TIlE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 102.

Specifically, cash, securities, and receivables to the aggregate value of not more than
$500 would be exempt under the proposed laws. Included in this aggregate is the income
tax refund check. Id., pt. 11, § 4-503(c)(3), at 125. Also included in that amount is accrued
vacation pay. Id.
123 In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 994 (2d Cir. 1973).

